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National Human Rights Institutions, Extraterritorial 
Obligations, and Hydropower in Southeast Asia: 
Implications of the Region’s Authoritarian Turn
Carl Middleton
► Middleton, C. (2018). National human rights institutions, extraterritorial obligations, and hydropower in 
Southeast Asia: Implications of the region’s authoritarian turn. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 
11(1), 81-97.
This article examines the role of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and trans-
national civil society in pursing Extraterritorial Obligation (ETO) cases in Southeast Asia 
as a means to investigate human rights threatened by cross-border investment projects. 
Two large hydropower dams under construction in Laos submitted to NHRIs from 
Thailand and Malaysia, namely the Xayaburi Dam and Don Sahong Dam, are detailed as 
case studies. The article argues that the emergence of ETOs in Southeast Asia, and its fu-
ture potential, is dependent upon the collaborative relationship between the NHRIs and 
transnational civil society networks. Whilst NHRIs are in positions of political authority 
to investigate cases, civil society also enable cases through networking, research, and 
public advocacy. Further institutionalization of ETOs is significant to emerging regional 
and global agendas on business and human rights, including the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights that both the Thai and Malaysian governments have 
expressed commitment to. However, in Thailand and its neighboring countries where 
investments are located there has been an authoritarian turn. Reflecting this, there are 
weakening mandates of NHRIs and reduced civil and political freedoms upon which civil 
society depends that challenges the ability to investigate and pursue cases.
Keywords: Civil Society; Don Sahong Dam; Mekong River; National Human Rights Commission of 
Thailand; Xayaburi Dam

INTRODUCTION
In Southeast Asia, new means are needed to ensure that governments and busi-
nesses protect and respect human rights. Transnational business activities are 
well-documented to have threatened or violated substantive and procedural 
human rights across the region, including industrial projects and special eco-
nomic zones, the extractive industry, hydropower dams, and agribusiness 
(Business and Human Rights Resource Center, 2015; Middleton & Pritchard, 
2013). In response, civil society have networked across the region and innovated 
new strategies, including working with the National Human Rights Commission 
of Thailand (NHRCT) to conduct cross-border investigations of Thai business 
practices in neighboring Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos (Thailand’s Extra-
Territorial Obligations Watch & Community Resource Center, 2018). The basis 
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of these investigations is that the Thai state has a responsibility to ensure that the 
practices of businesses operating from within its territory also respect human rights 
outside of it, especially in places where access to justice may be weak. These state 
duties towards protecting human rights beyond borders are known as Extraterritorial 
Obligations (ETOs) (ETO Consortium, 2013). Despite a tangible push back by gov-
ernments across Southeast Asia against human rights and its institutionalization 
(Gomez & Ramcharan, 2016; Welsh, 2017), and a broader turn towards political 
authoritarianism (Einzenberger & Schaffar, this issue; Dittmer, 2018; Pongsudhirak, 
2018), the NHRCT and civil society have had some qualified success in pursuing ETO 
investigations.
In this article, I argue that the emergence of ETOs in Southeast Asia, and its future 
potential, depends upon a productive relationship between the National Human 
Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and transnational civil society networks. The implica-
tion of this argument is that both appropriately mandated NHRIs and an active civil 
society empowered with political and civil freedoms – including across borders – are 
necessary for the further institutionalization and effective utilization of ETOs in the 
region. To substantiate this argument, I examine two dams currently under construc-
tion on the Mekong River’s mainstream, namely the Xayaburi Dam in Northern Laos 
and the Don Sahong Dam in Southern Laos. For the Xayaburi Dam, which has been 
investigated by the NHRCT, Thai construction firms and financiers are undertak-
ing the project. For the Don Sahong dam in Southern Laos, the lead developer is a 
Malaysian firm, and the project was considered by the Human Rights Commission of 
Malaysia (SUHAKAM). While I do not claim that NHRIs and ETOs are the sole – or 
even the most important – means to redress power imbalances and facilitate access to 
justice,1 I suggest that given the limited avenues for transnational justice in Southeast 
Asia they are important despite their constraints. For example, they enable a degree 
of access to information, offer an arena for deliberating the impacts of projects, and 
can raise public awareness via media coverage of investigations. Indeed, despite 
growing authoritarianism in Southeast Asia, transnational civil society and NHRIs 
to date have managed to maintain momentum towards building ETO investigations.
Conceptually, this article builds upon Hensengerth (2015) who examined the 
politics of decision-making and sources of political authority associated with 
hydropower projects on transboundary rivers. Taking the Xayaburi Dam as his case 
study, Hensengerth argued that the Government of Laos (GoL) worked through a 
transnational network to bolster its political authority to proceed with the project, 
including the Thai private hydropower consortium, the Thai state-owned electricity 
utility, and two international consultancy firms, which it commissioned to under-
take key studies. Hensengerth focuses on how the GoL was able to proceed with the 
Xayaburi Dam despite resistance from neighboring states – in particular Vietnam and 
Cambodia, and to an extent also Thailand (Rieu-Clarke, 2015a) – as well as an active 
transnational civil society campaign. In his analysis, he brings into relation state 
actors who are in authority “to resolve procedural issues”, and non-state actors who 
are an authority “to legitimize claims” (Hensengerth, 2015, p. 915). He argues that 
1 See also Khalfan (2013) cited in Grennan et al. (2016), and Middleton and Pritchard (2016), who list 
a range of accountability mechanisms that may be utilized in ETO cases, of which NHRIs are only one. 
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through collaborating with transnational non-state actors, including private sector, 
selective civil society actors, and supportive state agencies of neighboring countries 
(e.g., Thailand’s Ministry of Energy and the state electricity utility), an apparently 
weak government such as the GoL could bolster its regional political authority and 
ultimately proceed with the controversial hydropower project.
In contrast, this article explores the relationship between NHRIs and transnational 
civil society networks that produces countervailing political authority challenging large 
dam projects. The importance of transnational civil society networks in environmen-
tal politics is well-recognized (Doherty & Doyle, 2008), including how transnational 
civil society networks create “advocacy networks” with state actors to influence state 
action either at the national or international level (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004). Social 
movement theory demonstrates how civil society strategically networks and builds 
allied coalitions where shared values and interests exist (McCarthy & Zald, 2001). 
Civil society may simultaneously challenge some agencies of the state while build-
ing alliances with others (Middleton, Pengkam, & Tivasuradej, 2017). Following 
Hensengerth (2015), NHRIs are autonomous state agencies in positions of political 
authority, although their power is relatively limited. In Southeast Asia, for example, 
they may conduct investigations but not prosecutions (Grennan, Velarde, Zambrano, 
& Moallem, 2016). Conventionally, NHRIs are considered national political authori-
ties given that their investigations occurred only domestically. However, with the 
push towards investigating cases where investors from their country are building 
projects in neighboring countries, NHRIs are also emerging as transnational politi-
cal authorities through innovating the use of ETOs. Meanwhile, transnational civil 
society networks that have also responded to cross-border investment projects, and 
which are formed of organizations and community representatives in the host and 
home country, constitute actors who are an authority.
The article is structured as follows: In the next section, the research method is 
detailed, followed by a contextual discussion on the region’s authoritarian turn and 
the implications for NHRIs and civil society. I then outline key moments that have 
marked the emergence of ETOs in Southeast Asia, before turning to ETOs and the 
Xayaburi Dam and Don Sahong Dam. This is followed by a discussion and conclusion 
on the prospects for ETOs in the region. 
METHOD
This research is based upon in-depth interviews and participatory observation 
with community representatives, civil society groups, NHRIs, and the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). It is triangulated with 
literature reviewed from academic and civil society sources as well as credible news 
outlets. Expert interviews were conducted with senior campaigners (n=6) from five 
leading regional civil society organizations based in Thailand in mid-2016 on their 
work and experience of the regional human rights system in relation to hydropower 
development. Community leaders (n=4) involved in the campaigns on the Mekong 
and Salween rivers were also interviewed. Two interviews were conducted with a 
recent commissioner from the NHRCT (March 2016) and a current commissioner 
from SUHAKAM (October 2016). In Malaysia, a leading civil society organization 
84 | ASEAS 11(1)
National Human Rights Institutions, Extraterritorial Obligations, and Hydropower in Southeast Asia
and a researcher on ETOs were interviewed (October 2016). The researcher also par-
ticipated as a presenter in three AICHR regional workshops on Environment and 
Human Rights in September 2014, September 2015, and October 2017 where cross-
border responsibilities were an emergent topic of discussion. In February 2018, the 
researcher met with representatives from the lead developer of the Xayaburi Dam. 
In my role as an academic, I co-organized the first major conference on ETOs in 
Southeast Asia at Chulalongkorn University (Bangkok, Thailand) in September 2014. 
I have joined numerous workshops and seminars on the topics of business, environ-
ment, ETOs, and human rights in Southeast Asia with civil society, academics, and 
state actors over the past five years, often as a presenter. Overall, as a regionally-based 
academic, I have maintained a close relationship with civil society working on ETOs.
THE AUTHORITARIAN TURN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
Political authoritarianism is deepening across Southeast Asia (Pongsudhirak, 2018). 
In this section, I briefly survey features of this authoritarian turn and their implica-
tions for NHRIs and civil society. I address in particular state-NHRI and state-civil 
society relations, and the political and civic space for civil society and media. Given 
that it is the NHRCT that is most active on ETOs, I focus first on Thailand, and then 
more briefly on Malaysia given that SUHAKAM only recently considered the Don 
Sahong Dam as an ETO case. I then discuss Laos, where the Xayaburi Dam and Don 
Sahong Dam are located. 
Thailand
In Thailand, a military coup in 2014 heralded an increasingly limited space for civil 
and political rights, including a tightening space for media freedoms, increased use 
of the lese majeste law and Computer Crimes Act, and a constrained space for civil 
society (Mérieau, 2018; Peoples’ Empowerment Foundation, 2018). Section 44 of 
the interim 2014 constitution gave the military government unlimited legislative, 
executive, and judicial power. A new constitution was ratified in April 2017, paving 
the way for elections that are called for by a growing proportion of the population 
(McCargo, 2018). The new constitution considerably constrains the power of elected 
politicians (Mérieau, 2018).2 
The 2017 constitution affirmed the NHRCT’s continued existence, which for a 
while was in doubt. Under the military government, in 2015, a third batch of commis-
sioners was selected by a committee that was not inclusive of broad civil society and 
lacked transparency (Ashayagachat, 2015). As a result, the Global Alliance of National 
Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI, 2017) downgraded the NHRCT from A (fully 
compliant) to B (partially compliant) as gauged by the Paris Principles, which are an 
international benchmark assessing NHRIs capacity to work to protect and promote 
2 Significant powers have been given to the Constitutional Court, anti-corruption bodies, the Senate 
which had been fully appointed by the current military government for the first five years, and the National 
Strategy Committee formed of 35 military government appointed members who have defined a 20-year 
national strategy for Thailand. 
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human rights.3 The 2017 constitution also required a new Organic Act on National 
Human Rights Commission 2017, passed in August 2017. Under this new legislation, 
the NHRCT lost the power to file lawsuits to the Court of Justice, and to refer cases 
to the administrative or constitutional courts. In addition, a new responsibility to 
review and comment on the accuracy of reports produced by human rights organiza-
tions and release their findings was allocated to the NHRCT, raising concerns among 
civil society that the NHRCT might be called upon to defend the state (Peoples’ 
Empowerment Foundation, 2018). Civil society organizations have raised other con-
cerns regarding the reduced role for them on the NHRCT’s sub-commissions, which 
they previously viewed as a key means for substantive civil society participation. The 
pre-2015 NHRCT has not been without controversy either. However, a key flashpoint 
was the NHRCT report on major political protests in Bangkok in 2010, published at a 
time of high tension in 2013, that was criticized by some “for allegedly absolving the 
authorities while placing the blame for instigating the violence that led to the mili-
tary crackdown on the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship” (“NHRC 
Under Fire For”, 2013).
Malaysia
Until the recent election in May 2018, the same party coalition – the United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO) – ruled Malaysia as a parliamentary democracy for 
almost six decades (Milner, 2018). Regarding political and civil liberties, Freedom 
House (2016) labels Malaysia as “partly free”. Access to the political space and the 
capacity of civil society organizations are relatively limited, the media is not overly 
critical of the government, and the government largely maintains its authority to 
censure the press and to detain dissidents, including opposition politicians (see also 
Juego this issue). Operating under these conditions, although rated as grade A (fully 
compliant) according to the Paris Principles, SUHAKAM investigation recommen-
dations have “consistently failed to be tabled and debated in Parliament due to the 
Government’s indifference” (Suara Rakyat Malaysia, 2018, p. 22). Despite the politi-
cal challenges it faces, SUHAKAM is recognized as having made some progress on 
indigenous rights to land, on establishing a business and human rights agenda, and 
on maintaining its engagement with civil society (Interview with SUHAKAM com-
missioner, 2016; Interview with Malaysian civil society leader, 2016; Suara Rakyat 
Malaysia, 2018). The implications of the election of Pakatan Harapan in May 2018 for 
SUHAKAM’s role and space for civil society remains to be seen.
Laos
Laos is a single party socialist state. Since 1986, it has increasingly transitioned 
towards a market economy facilitated by a mixture of illiberal and quasi-neoliberal 
institutions (Barney, 2012). The single-party state remains strongly authoritarian 
with entrenched patronage networks (Gainsborough, 2012). While expanding the 
3 The Global Alliance on National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) is a global umbrella body that 
assesses and accredits NHRI (see also Grennan et al., 2016, pp. 12-13)
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economy, accelerating ‘resourcification’ via hydropower dams, mining, and land 
concessions is rapidly producing resource scarcity and numerous impacts on local 
communities (Lagerqvist, 2017). With regard to freedom of the press, domestic 
media is largely owned by the state. The constitution of Laos forbids mass media 
activities that are contrary to “national interests” or “traditional culture and dignity” 
(Lintner, 2016). Liberal forms of civil society are limited (Rehbein, 2011), and most 
“non-profit associations” (NPAs) are service-oriented or community-based and 
cannot undertake overt advocacy work (Belloni, 2014). In the late 2000s, political 
space for civil society appeared to be growing, cumulating in the 9th Asia Europe 
People’s Forum (AEPF) in Vientiane in October 2012 (Kepa, 2015). However, short-
ly afterwards, in December 2012, the Ramon Magsaysay award winner Sombath 
Somphone, who was also co-chair of the AEPF Lao National Organizing Committee, 
forcibly disappeared. Sombath’s disappearance has had a “chilling effect” on Laos’ 
civil society (Freedom House 2016; Interview with Thai civil society leader, 2016).
ECONOMIC REGIONALIZATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF ETOS 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Since the mid-1980s, governments and business in Southeast Asia have pursued 
economic regionalization and liberalization as a key policy agenda. From the 1990s, 
regionalization was principally pursued through the Asian Development Bank’s 
Greater Mekong Subregion program, since the mid-2000s also as a vision of ASEAN 
economic integration leading to the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015, 
and most recently via the China-led Belt-and-Road Initiative. Large-scale infrastruc-
ture has been central to these programs, including roads, railways, special economic 
zones, and hydropower dams, which have been associated with a range of human 
rights violations. Substantive human rights include the right to life, the right to 
health and the right to food. Procedural human rights include the right to participa-
tion, the right to access information, and the right to access justice (Business and 
Human Rights Resource Center, 2015; Middleton & Pritchard, 2013). 
Despite the challenge to human rights, numerous civil society groups includ-
ing public interest lawyers, NGOs, and community groups have sought to defend, 
reinforce, and innovate the region’s human rights system (Asian NGO Network on 
National Human Rights Institutions [ANNI], 2017). Given that domestic access to 
justice in some countries in Southeast Asia such as Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar 
is extremely weak, civil society organizations have sought to make cross-border 
investments more accountable through utilizing arenas within the home countries 
of investors rather than the location of investment. This effort has led to the emer-
gence of ETOs, especially in Thailand (Thai ETO Watch WG, 2017). The nascent 
practice of ETOs reflects a wider global trend in which transnational obligations are 
increasingly referenced in international human rights pronouncements (The Global 
Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2017).4 ETOs are, however, not 
universally endorsed, including due to the difficulties of conducting extraterritorial 
4 The implications of ETOs in international human rights law, in particular as it relates to Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, is mapped out in the Maastricht Principles (ETO Consortium, 2013).
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investigations (Grennan et al., 2016). In Southeast Asia, the government-claimed 
‘ASEAN way’ of non-interference also makes ETOs a politically sensitive issue that 
bounds the scope in which NHRIs may act. Yet, there are numerous examples of 
regional agreements that set in place bounds on sovereignty, for example, the 1995 
Mekong Agreement that mandates the Mekong River Commission, and various com-
mitments within ASEAN.
The first ETO case investigated in Southeast Asia was a sugarcane Economic Land 
Concession (ELC) in Koh Kong province, Cambodia, by the NHRCT. In 2006, the 
Cambodian government awarded the ELC to Thailand’s Khon Kaen Sugar Industry 
and a domestic company owned by an influential Cambodian senator. 456 house-
holds were dispossessed of approximately 5,000 ha of upland land where they grew 
swidden rice and various cash crops and raised cattle (EarthRights International [ERI] 
& Cambodia Legal Education Center [CLEC], 2013). The NHRCT complaint was filed 
in January 2010 by a Cambodian NGO, the Community Legal Education Centre 
of Cambodia (CLEC), and designated to the Subcommittee on Civil and Political 
Rights (SCPR). In July 2012, the SCPR concluded that it had jurisdiction to investi-
gate the case, despite the investment’s location in Cambodia (NHRCT, 2012a). The 
commission’s report, published in 2014, concluded that human rights violations had 
occurred, including the right to manage and benefit from resources and the right 
to life (NHRCT, 2015). It also concluded that the Thai government and the Thai 
company involved had failed in their respective duties and responsibilities towards 
human rights, and made a series of recommendations to the company and Thailand’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce.
The Koh Kong case entailed a transnational civil society movement undertaking 
advocacy to challenge the ELC developer (Sokphea, 2017). A range of actions were 
taken in addition to the complaint registered with the NHRCT, including direct pro-
test, submission of a case to the Koh Kong provincial court, direct communication 
with the company, a complaint submitted to the industry group Bonsucro and the 
OECD, and an attempted litigation in the UK court (where the purchaser of the sugar 
was based) (Middleton, 2014). While some families received compensation due to these 
actions, as of the time of writing, there remain families who are uncompensated for the 
loss of their land. Addressing why the case was so difficult to resolve, Sokphea (2017) 
highlights how a powerful constellation of political and economic elites in Cambodia 
sought to repress the civil society groups and community movement, together with the 
complexity of the sugar industry’s global supply chain that complicated accountability. 
This first ETO case demonstrates the close relationship between civil society 
groups (as an authority) and the NHRCT (as in authority). Civil society groups work-
ing in a transnational network from Cambodia and Thailand first brought the case 
to the NHRCT and subsequently supported the investigation through the provision 
of research reports, meetings with community leaders, and other forms of evidence. 
They also undertook public advocacy to maintain public awareness about the case and 
thus assert political pressure. Meanwhile, at the NHRCT, a progressive commissioner 
and key support staff were able to proceed with and conclude the case (Grennan et 
al., 2016; Interview with NHRCT commissioner, 2016). While at first it was individuals 
within the NHRCT who pushed forward an ETO agenda, over time with a now grow-
ing number of investigations they have, to-an-extent, become more institutionalized. 
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Until this case, NHRIs in Southeast Asia had interpreted their human rights obli-
gations as applicable only within their own borders. As the possibility of investigating 
cross-border cases became recognized, a discussion emerged in Thailand and more 
widely among ASEAN civil society on the potential for ETOs in Southeast Asia. For 
example, in September 2014, Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok hosted a regional 
conference titled “Rights-based governance beyond borders: The role of extraterrito-
rial obligations (ETOs)”. In April 2015, a session at the ASEAN Peoples Forum in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, titled “ETOs in cross-border investment: the role of human rights 
institutions” was organized. In October 2014, five NHRIs in Southeast Asia together 
with eleven civil society groups signed the “Bangkok Declaration on Extraterritorial 
Human Rights Obligations”, stating:
We recognise the urgency of advancing the implementation of extraterritorial 
obligations (ETOs) given the accelerating pace of trade, investment, and broad-
er economic integration between States in south-east Asia; the impending 
creation of the ASEAN Economic Community; increasing levels of migration 
and human trafficking in the region; and an increasing amount of cross-border 
economic, political, social, and military activity in the region and globally. (Asia 
Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development [APWLD], 2014)
HYDROPOWER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETOS
The construction of a large hydropower dam has the potential to violate a range 
of substantive and procedural human rights (Hurwitz, 2014). In Southeast Asia, an 
increasingly extensive program of large hydropower dam construction is underway 
in Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar to meet domestic electricity demand and 
for power export to neighboring Thailand, Vietnam, and China (Middleton & Dore, 
2015). Since 2006, plans for a cascade of up to eleven dams on the lower Mekong 
River’s mainstream have been revived (International Center for Environmental 
Management [ICEM], 2010). Two projects are under construction in Laos (Xayaburi 
and Don Sahong) and a third project, the Pak Beng Dam, commenced the Mekong 
River Commission’s (MRC) regional-level consultation process in December 2016. In 
this section, I first consider the role of the NHRCT in the Xayaburi Dam case.5 I then 
contrast this case with the role of the SUHAKAM in the Don Sahong Dam case.6
5 The 1,285 megawatt Xayaburi Dam in Xayabouri province, Northern Laos, will export 95% of its elec-
tricity to Thailand, and is owned and operated by a predominantly Thai private-sector consortium. The 
government of Laos and the project developer signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the Xayaburi 
Dam in May 2007, a Project Development Agreement in November 2008, and a Concession Agreement 
in November 2010. The MRC-facilitated Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement 
(PNPCA) process was initiated in September 2010 and claimed concluded by the Lao government in April 
2011 (although the governments of Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia requested further studies). The 
Power Purchase Agreement between the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand and the project de-
veloper was signed in October 2011. As of February 2018, the project is 90% complete. For details, see 
Matthews (2012), International Rivers (2014), Rieu-Clarke (2015a), and Middleton and Pritchard, (2016).
6 The 260 megawatt Don Sahong Dam is located 2 km upstream of the Cambodia border in the 
Siphandone Island complex on the Mekong River in Champasack province, Southern Laos. The project 
developer, the Malaysian company Mega First Corporation Berhad (MFCB), first signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Lao government in March 2006. Following the preparation of various studies, in 
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NHRCT and the Xayaburi Dam
The NHRCT, under the second batch of commissioners, accepted the case of the 
Xayaburi Dam after receiving a complaint from the Network of Thai People in Eight 
Mekong Provinces, submitted in May 2011. The complaint was based “on the grounds 
that the project lacked information disclosure and public participation, including 
an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Health Impact Assessment (HIA)” 
(NHRCT, 2012b). The Sub-Committee on Community Rights and Natural Resources 
(SCCRNR) of the NHRCT was assigned to investigate the complaint.
The NHRCT sent a written request to the project’s main developer, Ch. Karnchang, 
to submit a written testimony in response to the complaint, together with relevant 
government agencies including the central bank and the Ministry of Energy. They 
also approached the Thai commercial banks that provided loans to the project 
(International Rivers, 2012). As the inquiry proceeded, a NHRCT commissioner also 
visited impacted areas to talk with the communities. The NHRCT encouraged the 
community to conduct research that could be an input into the inquiry. These activi-
ties were coordinated with civil society (Interview with NHRCT commissioner and 
civil society groups, 2016).
On 21 February 2012, five months after the project’s Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) had been signed, the NHRCT organized a public hearing. In May 2012, the 
NHRCT issued an opinion where they recommended that “the Prime Minister 
should review the implementation of the dam construction” (NHRCT, 2012b). Issues 
of concern that raised questions about the signing of the PPA included the limited 
EIA prepared for the project, which did not include an assessment of transboundary 
impacts; and little sharing of information with the public about the project before 
the PPA had been signed (King, 2015). The public statement of the NHRCT (2012b) 
wrote:
We found that although this project may affect to the said issues [impacts on 
natural resources, environment and way of life of affected communities], the 
EGAT and the Thai government have not disclosed the PPA or any other rel-
evant information to the public before concluding the agreement. It is there-
fore not in line with the human rights protection principle, as prescribed in the 
constitution of Thailand, and a breach of the cabinet and NEPC’s [National 
Energy Policy Council] resolutions, including on the 1995 Mekong Agreement 
and good governance.
On completion of the inquiry by the NHRCT, a preliminary report was issued by 
the sub-committee, but a final report has not been completed and in principle is now 
the responsibility of the third NHRCT committee. However, it is not clear if the final 
report will be produced (Interview with civil society, 2016).
June 2014, the Lao government initiated the MRC-facilitated PNPCA. In June 2015, the MRC shifted this 
process to “diplomatic channels” when agreement could not be reached. The project’s Concession Agree-
ment was signed in September 2015 and a Power Purchase Agreement with Electricite Du Laos signed in 
October 2015. Project construction officially commenced in January 2016. For details of the Don Sahong 
Dam, see Baird (2011), International Rivers (2015), and EarthRights International (n.d.).
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Interviews with civil society groups who had worked with the Network of Thai 
People in Eight Mekong Provinces said that the NHRCT was “a very useful mecha-
nism for getting copies of documents that were unavailable, getting meetings with 
companies and government who weren’t available, and having an independent body 
investigate the situation and then file a report that was publicly available.” In a public 
meeting in 2018, another prominent campaigner commented that although the proj-
ect was not stopped, the civil society campaign did improve the project, including the 
construction of a fish passage structure and revised design for maintaining sediment 
movement reportedly at a cost of USD 100 million (“Xayaburi Dam Project Commits”, 
2012). They also noted that the most recent proposed project, the Pak Beng dam, had 
prepared a transboundary EIA study. 
Since the release of the preliminary report, civil society efforts shifted from the 
NHRCT process to the submission of a case to Thailand’s Administrative Court in 
August 2012, which had the potential to make more enforceable requirements on 
the involved state agencies (but not the private-sector developers) (Interview with 
civil society group, 2016). The case was submitted by community leaders from eight 
Thai provinces along the Mekong River on the basis that the decision-making process 
had not followed Thailand’s constitution that requires adequate public consulta-
tion, and that a transboundary EIA had not been prepared. Although the project is 
located in Laos, they claimed that the case should be under the court’s jurisdiction 
as Thai state agencies were key decision makers (also as electricity purchasers) and 
impacts could occur in Thailand due to the project being located on the Mekong 
River (Suriyashotichyangkul, 2012). In February 2013, however, the court announced 
that it did not accept jurisdiction on the case. In March 2013, the plaintiffs appealed 
to the Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand, and in June 2014, the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Thailand reversed the lower court decision. On 25 December 
2015, the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the case, and an appeal was filed 
in January 2016 that has not yet been concluded. The court case, however, was 
unprecedented for Thailand, as it investigates the implications of Thai investment 
in a neighboring country, even though it only considers the extent of the project’s 
impacts on Thai communities and thus is not fully an ETO case. However, in April 
2018, the Thai courts received a case submitted by Cambodian farmers against a 
Thai sugar producer that they claim has dispossessed them of their land, which if 
accepted would set a further precedent in terms of ETO cases in the Thai court sys-
tem (“Cambodian Farmers Sue Thai”, 2018).
The complexity of the role of NHRIs investigating cross-border investments is 
apparent from this case. The NHRCT emphasized its mandate to investigate and 
ensure compliance with Thailand’s human rights obligations in domestic law, inter-
national obligations, and those of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration passed in 
2012 related to the activities of Thai state agencies and private sector, including prac-
tices that occur outside of Thailand (Interview with NHRCT commissioner, 2016). At 
the same time, it does not have jurisdiction to inquire into state agencies of neighbor-
ing countries. To fulfill its constitutionally defined role requires a collaboration with 
civil society to enable meetings and further investigation with affected communities.
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SUHAKAM and the Don Sahong Dam
On 20 October 2014, six NGOs from Cambodia, Thailand, and the United States 
submitted a complaint against Mega First Corporation Berhad (MFCB), the developer 
of the Don Sahong project, to SUHAKAM. The basis of the complaint was the risk 
that the project posed to the right to health, the right to life and the right to liveli-
hood that are threatened by harms to fish stocks. Furthermore, violations over the 
right to information and the right to participation for riverside communities formed 
part of the complaint (Community Resource Centre, EarthRights International, 
International Rivers, NGO Forum on Cambodia, Northeastern Rural Development, & 
Cambodian Rural Development Team, 2014). The complaint is stated to be on behalf 
of Cambodian communities from Kratie and Stung Treng provinces and Thai com-
munities from Ubon Ratchathani, Chiang Rai, Nong Khai, and Bueng Kan provinces. 
In contrast to the NHRCT, SUHAKAM stated that they are unable to conduct an 
onsite visit to verify the claims of the complaint, given that “the Commission’s power 
and mandate are limited within the boundaries of Malaysia” (SUHAKAM, 2015, p. 95). 
Instead, SUHAKAM considered itself as a mediator (Interview with SUHAKAM 
commissioner, 2016). SUHAKAM first met with MFCB to discuss the complaint 
in February 2015, and following a response by the complainants to MFCB’s initial 
response, a second meeting was held in August 2015 at which MFCB disputed the 
complainants’ analysis. SUHAKAM concluded that: 
Given that there is no National Human Rights Institution in Laos, the Com-
mission finds it difficult to proceed further with the inquiry into the complaint. 
Therefore, guided by its mandate to provide recommendations on issues in-
volving human rights, the Commission wrote to MFCB on 8 December, and 
recommended MFCB to ensure that its business operations and activities are 
conducted in a manner which respects the human rights of the people living 
in the affected areas, besides generating profit out of the project. (SUHAKAM, 
2015, p. 96)
SUHAKAM also recommended to the Malaysian government to “formulate poli-
cies or guidelines to monitor Malaysian companies operating outside of Malaysia in 
order to ensure compliance with applicable human rights principles and standards 
as provided under Principle 3 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (UNGPs)” (SUHAKAM, 2015, p. 96). 
Several interviewees highlighted that there was comparatively little political pres-
sure upon the Malaysian government and MFCB to respond to the issues raised by 
SUHAKAM due to the limited media coverage in Malaysia on the impact of the Don 
Sahong Dam. This reveals the crucial role of civil society in working with the NHRI. 
Cambodian and international civil society groups brought the case to SUHAKAM, 
generating media interest in mainland Southeast Asia, which is not surprising given 
the broader public interest in the Mekong mainstream dams. However, in Malaysia 
there is a comparatively limited civil society, with little experience on ETOs, and thus 
few opportunities to build public awareness that contributed to the lack of traction 
in the investigation. 
92 | ASEAS 11(1)
National Human Rights Institutions, Extraterritorial Obligations, and Hydropower in Southeast Asia
MOMENTUM TOWARDS ETOS IN THAILAND AND BEYOND
There has been a growing trend for Thai-based companies to invest overseas since the 
1980s. In 2015, 37% of the 517 firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand invested 
outside of Thailand, with 60% of these firms investing in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
or Vietnam (SET Research Department, 2016). According to research by the Thai 
ETO Watch Working Group (2017), among these are at least 13 megaprojects, includ-
ing large agricultural land concessions, industrial special economic zones, and energy 
projects (gas, hydropower, coal-fired power stations) that have been documented to 
create environmental and social harms. These projects, if built in Thailand, would 
have been challenged legally and through community protest. Therefore, developers 
are exploiting weaker civil and political freedoms, legal standards, and institutions in 
neighboring countries (Interview with civil society 2016).
Thai civil society groups have called on the Thai government to regulate these 
investments through an outbound investment law and oversight body. A significant 
development occurred in May 2016, when the Thai government issued a cabinet 
resolution on outbound investment recommending compliance with the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP). The resolution 
was directed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry 
of Justice, and was at least partly in response to the NHRCT’s ETO investigations 
into the Dawei Special Economic Zone in Myanmar and Hongsa lignite-fired power 
station in Laos (Suk, 2017). The Ministry of Justice was also given responsibility to 
develop Thailand’s National Action Plan (NAP) for the UNGP, working with the other 
two ministries. A second cabinet resolution was issued in May 2017 regarding an ETO 
investigation into a sugarcane concession in Cambodia in Oddar Meanchey. These 
resolutions have also been interpreted by the NHRCT as mandating its role in inves-
tigating ETO cases (Public statement by NHRCT commissioner, 2018, 1 June). Prime 
Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha has spoken on several occasions on his expec-
tation that businesses adopt the UNGP (Ministry of Finance, 2017). Most recently, 
a high-profile invited visit by the United Nations Working Group on Business and 
Human Rights in April 2018 assessed a range of areas of progress as well as out-
standing problems, including closing civic space and the need to restore and further 
strengthen the NHRCT’s mandate (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner, 2018). Over the duration of this recent interest in the UNGP by the 
Thai government, Thai civil society groups have maintained a watchdog role on its 
implementation. For example, in November 2017, the Thai ETO Watch Working 
Group presented their analysis to the UN Business and Human Rights Forum in 
Geneva (Thai ETO Watch WG, 2017). According to the Thai ETO Watch Working 
Group (2017):
The drafting of the NAP has involved input from CSOs [Civil Society Organisa-
tions] working on migrant labor, human trafficking, LGBT rights and dis-
crimination, and land and natural resource rights within Thailand. However, 
Thailand’s current draft NAP fails to integrate the extraterritorial obligations 
of Thai investors, nor does it include a mechanism for affected communities to 
seek justice and remedies. (p. 7)
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Meanwhile, the third round of the NHRCT Commission has also taken up a num-
ber of ETO cases, including on the Heinda mine and Dawei Special Economic Zone in 
Tanintharyi region, Myanmar, both of which involve Thai companies (Wongcha-um, 
2017). Additional hydropower projects are investigated on the mainstream of the 
Mekong River and Salween River (Sukprasert, 2017). Asides from attempting to 
maintain the principle of investigating ETOs, the NHRCT aims to further the imple-
mentation of the UNGP in Thailand.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This article has evaluated the roles, opportunities, and challenges for NHRIs to protect 
and promote human rights via ETOs, which are of growing interest in the region. It 
has detailed how, in spite of the region’s growing political authoritarianism, it has been 
possible for Thailand’s NHRCT in particular to (continue to) undertake ETO cases. The 
article has argued that the interaction of the NHRI as in authority and transnational 
civil society as an authority is crucial to the innovation of ETOs in the region. Within 
a relatively short period, since 2010, ETOs have emerged as an increasingly established 
mechanism, in Thailand at least. In the cases of both Xayaburi Dam and Don Sahong 
Dam, the role of civil society was important for raising the case in the first place, 
drawing upon transnational networks, and then providing evidence and maintaining 
political momentum. Regarding the Xayaburi Dam, while it is arguably the national 
court case that has had the greatest impact in Thailand in terms of seeking to hold state 
agencies accountable for the project, the complaint first submitted to the NHRCT was 
an important initial attempt by communities and civil society groups to raise questions 
about the project and its environmental, social, and human rights impacts. Together 
with other ETO cases, it has contributed to a broader momentum towards the UNGP 
and the preparation of a National Action Plan in Thailand. For the Don Sahong Dam, 
while the impact upon the project is less clear and the case within SUHAKAM did 
not proceed beyond a limited discussion with the company, the case did draw some 
attention to the responsibilities of Malaysian companies investing overseas and led to 
recommendations towards the government which could be considered significant as 
Malaysia also works towards developing a National Action Plan for the UNGP. 
An examination of the co-productive relationship between NHRIs and civil soci-
ety on ETOs also offers some insights in ongoing research about legal pluralism in 
Southeast Asia (Breslin & Nesaduri, 2018). While certainly not discounting the role 
of the state, these studies draw attention to the role of non-state actors in producing 
norms, rules, standards, and practices that reshape ecological governance in a range 
of sectors, including transboundary water governance (Boer, Hirsch, Johns, Saul, & 
Scurrah, 2016; Rieu-Clarke, 2015b). Studying the emergence of ETOs reveals the sig-
nificance of interaction between allied state and non-state actors in producing a new 
transboundary governance regime, where the normative basis of ETOs draws on the 
government’s already stated commitments to international human rights law and 
civil societies’ expectation that these commitments be fulfilled. 
Overall, ETOs as a recent innovation in the regional human rights system have 
offered new opportunities for access to information and public participation in partic-
ular. However, there are contradictions within the rise of the governments’ business 
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and human rights agenda. In Thailand, the current National Council for Peace and 
Order (NCPO) government has publicly stated its support for the UNGP agenda and 
instructed state agencies to prepare plans accordingly (although not specifically on 
ETOs). At the same time, there has been a closing space for political, civil, and media 
freedoms with implications for civil society and community activists, together with a 
weakening of the mandate of the NHRCT. The implications are that even as limited 
discussion on business and human rights is officially invited by the government, the 
means to investigate and pursue cases where human rights have been threatened or 
violated are in fact weakened. Meanwhile, in neighboring countries, the closing of 
civil and political space for civil society to work on human rights, both domestically 
and across borders is also an important consideration for the potential of future ETO 
cases. In Cambodia, for example, NGOs and critical media outlets have been shut 
down and the main opposition party disbanded since 2016, which holds implications 
for how Cambodian civil society working on human rights can operate and network, 
including in cross-border cases. Given the transnational character of some human 
rights cases in Southeast Asia, including in the case of large hydropower dams on 
transboundary rivers, and the uneven access to justice across the region, ETOs could 
be a significant transboundary justice mechanism. However, to consolidate and insti-
tutionalize ETOs will require sustained work by both NHRIs and civil society.

REFERENCES
Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions. (2017). 2017 ANNI report on the performance 
and establishment of national Human Rights Institutions in Asia. Bangkok: Forum Asia.
Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development. (2014). Bangkok declaration on extraterritorial Hu-
man Rights obligations. Chiang Mai: Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD).
Ashayagachat, A. (2015, August 5). UN warns on human rights watchdog. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/646400/un-warns-on-human-rights-watchdog
Baird, I. G. (2011). The Don Sahong dam: Potential impacts on regional fish migrations, livelihoods and 
human health. Critical Asian Studies, 43(2), 211-235.
Barney, K. (2012). Locating ‘Green Neoliberalism,’ and other forms of environmental governance in South-
east Asia. Newsletter: Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University, 66(Autumn), 25-28.
Belloni, R. (2014). Building civil society in Lao PDR: The decree on associations. Development in Practice, 
24(3), 353-365.
Betsill, M. M., & Buckley, H. (2004). Transnational networks and global environmental governance: The 
cities for climate protection program. International Studies Quarterly, 48(2), 471-493.
Boer, B., Hirsch, P., Johns, F., Saul, B., & Scurrah, N. (2016). The Mekong: A socio-legal approach to river basin 
development. Abingdon: Earthscan.
Breslin, S., & Nesadurai, H. E. S. (2018). Who governs and how? Non-state actors and transnational gover-
nance in Southeast Asia. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48(2), 187-203.
Business and Human Rights Resource Center. (2015). Development for all, or a privileged few? Business & 
human rights in Southeast Asia. Business and Human Rights Resource Center.
Cambodian farmers sue Thai sugar group Mitr Phol over alleged land grab. (2018, April 2). Reuters. Re-
trieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-thailand-sugar/cambodian-farmers-sue-
thai-sugar-group-mitr-phol-over-alleged-land-grab-idUSKCN1H90P6
Community Resource Centre, EarthRights International, International Rivers, NGO Forum on Cambo-
dia, Northeastern Rural Development, & Cambodian Rural Development Team. (2014). Complaint to 
ASEAS 11(1) | 95
Carl Middleton
the Human Rights commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) against Mega First Corporation Berhad, project 
developer of the Don Sahong dam, Lao PDR. Retrieved from https://earthrights.org/wp-content/
uploads/141020_complaint_against_mega_first_corp_berhad.pdf
Dittmer, L. (2018). Asia in 2017: Return of the strongman. Asian Survey, 98(1), 1-9.
Doherty, B., & Doyle, T. (2008). Beyond borders: Transnational politics, social movements, and modern 
environmentalisms. In B. Doherty & T. Doyle. (Eds.), Beyond borders: Environmental movements and 
transnational politics (pp. 1-16). London: Routledge.
EarthRights International & Cambodia Legal Education Center. (2013). Business, Human Rights and the 
environment in ASEAN: The implications of the Koh Kong sugar plantation case in Cambodia for due dili-
gence and remedies. Washington DC & Phnom Penh: EarthRights International (ERI) & Cambodia Legal 
Education Center (CLEC).
EarthRights International. (n.d.). Don Sahong Dam. Retrieved from https://earthrights.org/case/don-
sahong-dam/
ETO Consortium. (2013). Maastricht principles on extraterritorial obligation of states in the area of economic, 
social and cultural rights. Heidelberg: FIAN International.
Freedom House (2016). Freedom in the world: Laos. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/2016/laos
Gainsborough, M. (2012). Elites vs. reform in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Journal of Democracy, 23(2), 34-46.
Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. (2017). Chart of the status of national institutions: Accred-
itation status as of 26 May 2017. Geneva: Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI).
Gomez, J., & Ramcharan, R. (2016). The “protection” capacity of national human rights institutions in Southeast 
Asia. Hong Kong: Southeast Asia Research Center, City University of Hong Kong.
Grennan, K., Velarde, W. D. G., Zambrano, A. T., & Moallem, S. (2016). The role of NHRIs to redress trans-
boundary human rights violations: A Southeast Asian case study. Lund: Raoul Wallenberg Institute of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law & Columbia University.
Hensengerth, O. (2015). Where is the power? Transnational networks, authority and the dispute over the 
Xayaburi Dam on the Lower Mekong Mainstream. Water International, 40(5-6), 911-928.
Hurwitz, Z. (2014). Dam standards: A rights-based approach – a guide book for civil society. Berkeley: Inter-
national Rivers.
International Center for Environmental Management (ICEM). (2010). Strategic environmental assessment of 
hydropower on the Mekong mainstream: Final report. Hanoi: ICEM.
International Rivers. (2015). The Don Sahong Dam: Gambling with Mekong food security and livelihoods. 
Berkeley: International Rivers.
International Rivers. (2014). Xayaburi dam: Timeline of events (Last updated: April 2014). Retrieved from 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/9200
International Rivers. (2012, February 29). Press release: Thailand defies neighbors on contentious Xayaburi 
Dam. Retrieved from https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/thailand-defies-neighbors-on-
contentious-xayaburi-dam-3686
Kepa. (2015). Reflections on Lao civil society. Retrieved from https://www.kepa.fi/tiedostot/reflection_
paper_laos_2015_0.pdf 
King, D. (2015). Regulating social and environmental risk in ASEAN financial integration:The Xayaburi 
dam project in Lao PDR and Thai Banks. In M. Mohan & C. Morel (Eds.), Business and human rights in 
Southeast Asia: Risk and the regulatory turn (pp. 101-113). London: Routledge.
Lagerqvist, Y. F. (2017). Laos: Abundance, scarcity and the shifting role of natural resources. In P. Hirsch 
(Ed.), Routledge handbook of the environment in Southeast Asia (pp. 390-399). Abingdon: Routledge.
Lintner, B. (2016, March 29). Laos is open for business, but on its own terms. World Politics Review. 
Retrieved from https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18325/laos-is-open-for-business-but-
on-its-own-terms
Matthews, N. (2012). Water grabbing in the Mekong basin: An analysis of the winners and losers of 
Thailand’s hydropower development in Lao PDR. Water Alternatives, 5(2),392-411.
McCargo, D. (2018). Thailand in 2017: Politics on hold. Asian Survey, 58(1), 181-187.
96 | ASEAS 11(1)
National Human Rights Institutions, Extraterritorial Obligations, and Hydropower in Southeast Asia
McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (2001). The enduring vitality of the resource mobilization theory of social 
Movements. In J. H. Turner (Ed.), Handbook of sociological theory (pp. 533-565). New York: Springer.
Mérieau, E. (2018, January 30). Thailand’s deepening authoritarian rule. East Asia Forum. Retrieved from 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/01/30/thailands-deepening-authoritarian-rule/
Middleton, C. (2014). Determinedly seeking justice: The case study of Koh Kong sugar industry concession, 
Srae Ambel district, Koh Kong province. In Access to productive agricultural land by the landless, land poor 
and smallholder farmers in the four Lower Mekong River Basin countries: Three case studies. [Unpublished 
report].
Middleton, C., & Dore, J. (2015). Transboundary water and electricity governance in mainland Southeast 
Asia: Linkages, disjunctures and implications. International Journal of Water Governance, 3(1), 93-120.
Middleton, C., & Pritchard, A. (2016). Arenas of water justice on transboundary rivers: A case study of the 
Xayaburi dam, Laos. In D. J. H. Blake & L. Robins (Eds.), Water governance dynamics in the Mekong region 
(pp. 55-90). Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Center.
Middleton, C., & Pritchard, A. (2013). Corporate accountability in ASEAN: A human rights-based approach. 
Bangkok: Forum Asia.
Middleton, C., Pengkam, S., & Tivasuradej, A. (2017). Politics of knowledge, collective action and com-
munity empowerment: Health impact assessment in Thailand: The case of Khao Hinsorn. In D. 
Suhardiman, A. Nicol, & E. Mapedza (Eds.), Water governance and collective action: Multi-scale challenges 
(pp. 70-81). London: Earthscan.
Milner, A. (2017) Malaysia in 2017: Clever politics, deeper transformation. Asian Survey, 58(1), 174-180.
Ministry of Finance. (2017, 31 May) Seminar on driving forward the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights in Thailand. Retrieved from http://www2.mof.go.th/picture_news_detail.
php?id=10942.
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand. (2015). Allegation that Khon Kaen Sugar Industry Pub-
lic Company Limited, recipient of a land concession to grow sugarcane and establish a sugar factory in 
Cambodia, has caused human rights violations against Cambodian citizens. Findings Report No. 115/2558. 
Retrieved from https://earthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/unofficial_english_translation_-_tnhrc_
report_on_findings_-_koh_kong_land_concession_cambodia.pdf
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand. (2012a). Findings of the subcommittee on civil and politi-
cal rights of the national human rights committee of Thailand on the Koh Kong sugar cane plantation in 
Cambodia. Bangkok: NHRCT.
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand. (2012b, May 4). National human rights commission of 
Thailand’s press release on Xayaburi (unofficial translation). Bangkok: NHRCT.
NHRC under fire for being ‘partial to impartiality’. (2013, August 18). Bangkok Post. Retrieved from https://
www.bangkokpost.com/news/investigation/365167/nhrc-under-fire-for-being-partial-to-impartiality 
Peoples’ Empowerment Foundation. (2018). Thailand: Operating under military coup government. In Y. S. 
Seng & A. Juanda (Eds.), 2017 ANNI Report on the performance and establishment of national human rights 
institutions in Asia (pp. 52-66). Bangkok: Forum Asia.
Pongsudhirak, T. (2018, January 1). Authoritarianism is accelerating in Southeast Asia. Nikkei Asian Review. 
Retrieved from https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Looking-ahead-2018/Authoritarianism-is-ac-
celerating-in-Southeast-Asia
Rehbein, B. (2011). Laos. In T. Chong & S. Elies (Eds.), An ASEAN community for all: Exploring the scope for 
civil society engagement (pp. 63-72). Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Rieu-Clarke, A. (2015a). Notification and consultation procedures under the Mekong agreement: Insights 
from the Xayaburi controversy. Asian Journal of International Law 5(1), 143-175.
Rieu-Clarke, A. (2015b). Transboundary hydropower projects seen through the lens of three international 
legal regimes: Foreign investment, environmental protection and human rights. International Journal 
of Water Governance, 1, 27-48.
SET Research Department. (2016). 2015 Outward foreign direct investment of Thai listed firms. Bangkok: 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).
Sokphea, Y. (2017). Transnational advocacy networks in global supply chains: A study of civil society orga-
nizations’ sugar movements in Cambodia. Journal of Civil Society, 13(1), 35-53.
ASEAS 11(1) | 97
Carl Middleton
Suara Rakyat Malaysia. (2018). Malaysia: A misrepresented commission and the executives alibi for viola-
tion. In Y. S. Seng & A. Juanda (Eds.), 2017 ANNI report on the performance and establishment of national 
human rights institutions in Asia (pp. 22-30). Bangkok: Forum Asia.
SUHAKAM. (2015). Suhakam Annual Report 2015. Kuala Lumpur: Human rights commission of Malaysia 
(SUHAKAM).
Suk, W. (2017). Writing the rulebook: Will Thailand force its businesses to respect human rights? Retrieved 
from https://www.earthrights.org/blog/writing-rulebook-will-thailand-force-its-businesses-respect-
human-rights 
Sukprasert, P. (2017, March 19). The Dawei development dream left high and dry. Bangkok Post. Retrieved 
from https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/special-reports/1217529/the-dawei-development-dream-
left-high-and-dry
Suriyashotichyangkul, C. (2012) Spirit of the Mekong: A big day for the future of the river. Retrieved from 
http://www.earthrights.org/blog/spirit-mekong-big-day-future-river
Thai ETO Watch WG. (2017). Thai outbound investments in the Mekong region and Myanmar: Protecting hu-
man rights and ensuring due diligence in Thailand’s outbound investments. Bangkok: Thai ETO Watch WG.
Thailand’s Extra-Territorial Obligations Watch & Community Resource Center. (2018). Thai outbound 
investments in ASEAN: Human rights violations, extra-territorial obligations and accountability. In 
Business and human rights: Learnings from Asia. Working Paper Series: Asian perspectives on international 
human rights landscapes Number 3: March 2018 (pp. 25-38). Bangkok: Forum Asia.
The Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (2017). Human rights law sources: UN pro-
nouncements on extra-territorial obligations. Geneva: The Global Initiative for Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. (2018). Statement at the end of visit to 
Thailand by the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights. Retrieved from http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22915&LangID=E
Welsh, B. (2017). Tough year for human rights in Southeast Asia. New Mandala. Retrieved from http://
www.newmandala.org/tough-year-human-rights-southeast-asia/
Wongcha-um, P. (2017, April 5). Thai-owned mine in Myanmar investigated for human rights violations. 
Channel News Asia. Retrieved from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/thai-owned-mine-
in-myanmar-investigated-for-human-rights-violati-8710266
Xayaburi dam project commits 100 million dollars to redesign. (2012, July 19). The Nation. Retrieved from 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Xayaburi-dam-project-commits-100-million-
dollars-t-30186538.html 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Carl Middleton is deputy director of the MA in International Development Studies Program, 
and director of the Center for Social Development Studies at Chulalongkorn University, 
Thailand. His research interests orientate around the politics and policy of the environment 
in Southeast Asia, with a particular focus on social movements, environmental justice, and the 
political ecology of water and energy.
► Contact: carl.chulalongkorn@gmail.com
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was funded by the SHAPE-SEA project. This article is partly based on a paper pre-
sented at the “International Conference on National Human Rights Mechanisms in Southeast 
Asia: Challenges of Protection”, 13-14 July 2017, Asia Center, Bangkok, Thailand.
